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It is only recently that the interest of the academic 
community has been drawn to the particulars of the 
EEC’s system for the protection of human rights.1 
Several factors contributed to the development of 
this new field of Community literature. First, the in­
creasing number of human rights violation cases that 
during the last few years have come before the 
Community’s Court of Justice. Second, the fact that 
in its reports the EEC Commission has, in several 
occasions, treated the rights of the individual as a 
matter of great significance for the future of Euro­
pean integration.2 Finally, memories from gross vio­
lation of fundamental freedoms in Greece, the 
Community’s first associate member and now an ap­
plicant for full membership—along with the general 
question of geographical expansion of the Commu­
nity towards the Mediterranean region, a politically 
unstable part of Europe—have given additional im­
petus to discussions on the subject.3
1. See written communication submitted by Pierre Pescatore, 
Judge of the EEC Court of Justice, to the Parliamentary Confer­
ence on Human Rights, held in Vienna, 18-20 October 1971, 
under the auspices of the Council of Europe (Doc. AS/Coll. DH 
(71)8). Also the results of a special session of the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (held in Strasbourg on June 12,1975) on the protection of 
fundamental rights within the European Communities. Also the 
published discussions on the same issue at the 7th International 
Congress of the International Federation of European Law 
(FIDE) of 2 to 4 of October 1975 (Brussels) and the 4th Interna­
tional Colloquium on the European Human Rights Convention of 
5 to 8 of November, 1975 held in Rome.
2. See e.g. the Davingnon report of July 20, 1970: «United 
Europe shall be based on a common heritage of respect for funda­
mental liberties and human rights». See also, Bulletin of the Euro­
pean Communities, «Report on European Union» Supplement 
5/1975: «The general political vocation of the European Union 
and the extension of its competence to include fields more and 
more closely connected with the life of the citizen argue in favour 
of a formal affirmation of human rights. They should be given the 
force of rules of law which can be applied by the courts and which 
the Union institutions will have to observe when exercising their 
powers and indeed provide by adopting positive standards for their 
effective implementation (this applies particularly to economic and 
social rights)...» See further Bulletin of the Communities 
«European Union», Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the Euro­
pean Council, Supplement 1/1976: «The gradual increase in the 
powers of the European institutions which will make itself felt 
while the Union is being built up, will make it imperative to ensure 
that rights and fundamental freedoms, including economic and 
social rights are both recognized and protected. In this the Union 
will find confirmation of its political objectives», and finally Bulle­
tin of the European Communities «The protection of fundamental 
rights in the European Community» Supplement 5/1976.
3. See e.g. D.W. Jones, «Human Rights in Europe after the 
Greek Case: Action Plan for Strengthening the Safeguards», 
European Review, XXI, No. 4 (1971) 22ss; John Pesmatzoglou, 
«Greece and the European Community» in H. Vlachos ed., Free 
Greek Voices-A Political Anthology (London: Doric Publications, 
(1971), 74-77; Arne Trenhold, «Europe and the Greek 
Dictatorship» in R. Clogg & G. Yannopoulos eds., Greece under 
Military Rule (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1972), 163-190, and G. 
Yannopoulos, Greece and the European Communities-The First 
Decade of a Troubled Association, Sage Research Papers in the
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The studies so far produced have dealt with various 
aspects of the Community’s human rights treaty-law 
and have attempted critical reviews of the Court of 
Justice’s case-law. In their total these studies have 
been very cautious in making suggestions for drastic 
changes in the system.4 This paper will also avoid 
over-ambitious proposals in the understanding that 
any consideration of human rights issues separately 
from prevailing realities and short-term European in­
tegration prospects would be unrealistic. It is with 
this understanding, however, that the suggestion is 
made that progress towards political unification in 
the Community might be facilitated should some ad­
justments to existing human rights law and im­
plementation mechanisms be brought about.
The preamble of the Treaty of Rome refers to the 
strengthening of «the safeguards of peace and 
liberty» as one of the primary objectives of «an even 
closer union among the European peoples». From 
the text that follows, however, it becomes evident 
that the «contracting states» undertake no specific 
obligation to guarantee certain individual liberties in 
their dealings with their own citizens or other persons 
within their jurisdiction.5 This does not mean that no 
explicit or implicit reference to human rights is made 
into the treaty. On the contrary there are provisions 
that seek the promotion of certain aspects of the 
rights of the European homo economicus et socialis, 
rights that come very close to those defined as 
economic and social rights by the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of 1948.
The positive norms contained in these provisions 
can be summarized under two headings: (a) the prin­
ciple of equality; e.g. Article 7 of the EEC Treaty 
provides that «any discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited», and such discrimina­
tion is excplicitly prohibited in matters of common 
agricultural policy (Articles 40 and 45), transporta­
tion (Article 79), imposition of charges (Article 95) 
and (b) the principle of freedom, e.g., freedom of
Social Sciences (Contemporary European Studies) 1975, particu­
larly pp. 21-31; Dimitris C. Constas, The Greek Case before the 
Organs of the Council of Europe: 1967-1969 (Athens: Papazissis 
Publishing House, 1976), particularly pp. 146-147, 182-185.
4. See Pierre Pescatore, «Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in 
the System of the European Communities», American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Voi. 18 (1970), 343-351, and «Protection of 
Human Rights in the European Communities», Common Market 
Law Review,\ol. IX (1972),73-79;Gottfried Zieger,Das Grund­
rechtsproblem in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Tübingen, 
n.p., 1970); Max Sorensen, «The Enlargement of the European 
Communities and the Protection of Human Rights», Annuaire 
Européen (European Yearbook), Vol. XIX (1973), 1-17; and C. 
Shachor-Landau, «Protection of Fundamental Rights and Sources 
of Law in European Community Jurisprudence», Journal of World 
Trade Law, Voi. 10, No. 3 (May-June 1976), 289-300.
5. Sorensen, op. cit., n. 4.
movement for workers (Article 48 et seq.), freedom 
of establishment (Article 52 et seq.), free supply of 
services within the Community (Article 59 et seq.) 
etc.
A number of issues emerge as a result of this 
human rights treaty-law of the Community. Besides 
the question of interpretation and actual implemen­
tation of these provisions—a heavy load for any judi­
cial organ—the nature of the whole issue of human 
rights and the peculiar character of the Community’s 
pattern of relations give rise to additional, equally 
fundamental problems. A standard of «public 
interest»—limitation to the exercise of these rights, is 
one of them. A second is the ralationship and hierar­
chy among three distinct but interrelated legal or­
ders, namely international, Community and national, 
in the specific area of human rights. A third and 
probably more important one is that, even at the 
elementary stage of «politicai» union in which the 
EEC currently operates, the possibility can not be 
ruled out that other rights (of those that come closer 
to the classical definition of political rights) may be 
infringed upon, as a result of the exercise of certain of 
the functions already assigned to the Communities.6 
It is in the light of these questions that those Com­
munity organs which have a say in human rights mat­
ters assume a high degree of responsibility.
At the decision-preparatory stage, the European 
Community’s Commission, the Parliament and the 
Council, all take part in a system of legal checks 
against human rights abuses. According to a decision 
taken in 1958, all documents intended for the 
Commission«... either with a view to their forming the 
subject of a proposal to the Council or for the adop­
tion of one of the measures laid down in Article 189, 
are at first to be referred to the Legal Service».7 The 
Legal Service of the Commission, therefore, as the 
one of the Council, has the duty «...to clarify any 
fundamental rights questions which may arise with 
regard to general legal principles or the constitutional 
traditions of one or more Member States».8
In case of Community acts, in respect of which the 
Commission has the right to make only a proposal, 
responsibility for human rights issues rests with the 
European Parliament which discusses, and with the 
Council that makes the decision. If the Parliament 
finds that the rights of the individual may be ad­
versely affected by the Commission’s proposals it 
may ask it to reconsider and modify them pursuant to 
Article 149(2) of the EEC Treaty. At the final stage 
the Council, with the Commission and experts from
6. See Bulletin of the European Communities, «The
protection...», op. cit., n. 2, p. 28.
7. Decision of October 1, 1958, Doc. COM (58), Minutes 31.
8. See Bulletin of the European Communities, «The
protection...», op. cit., n. 2, p. 12.
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member-states participating in the work, is able to 
ensure that any issues bearing on human rights have 
received satisfactory solutions.
But, undoubtedly, the actor of primary impor­
tance, in this «checks and balances» system, a system 
that according to Judge Pescatore stresses the differ­
ence between the Community and other purely inter­
governmental bodies,9 is the Court of Justice. The 
supranational character and the powers wielded by 
this Court, represents a significant advance beyond 
that of previous international tribunals.10
According to the Treaties, four different types of 
legal action may be pursued in this Court: action 
against member states for breach of their treaty ob­
ligations (EEC Art. 169); supervision of the legality 
of rules and decisions issued by the Community in­
stitutions (Art. 173); reparations for damages caused 
by the Community to third parties (Arts 178 and 
215); preliminary rulings on questions involving the 
interpretation of Community law or the validity of 
Community decisions sought by national tribunals 
(Art. 177). It is then apparent from the above that 
suits testing the legality of Community acts, the tort 
actions, and the requests for preliminary rulings on 
the validity of Community decisions might be used in 
order to seek redress for an infringement of funda­
mental rights and freedoms.11
Given this broad jurisdictional competence we can 
now discuss types of substantive law that the Court 
may draw upon in the exercise of its jurisdiction over 
cases involving human rights questions. When we de­
scribed above12 the Community’s human rights 
treaty-law, we came up with a number of questions 
resulting from the limited scope and the ambiguity 
that characterize this law. The obvious issue then, is 
to examine how and to what extent these provisions 
may, and have actually been supplemented by other 
sources of law, so as to provide for a more sound 
legal basis for the protection of rights of the indi­
vidual within the Community.
In this context, two key provisions of the EEC 
Treaty must be considered, namely Articles 164 and 
173. The first defines the general role of the Court of 
Justice as follows: «the Court of Justice shall ensure 
the observance of law and justice in the interpreta­
tion of this Treaty». The second, dealing with 
«appeals for annulment» of unlawful Community 
acts, specifies as one of the grounds for the déclara­
it See Pierre Pescatore, «International Law and Community 
Law — A Comparative Analysis», Common Market Law Review, 
Voi. VII (1970), 172.
10. See Forest L. Grieves, Supranationalism and International 
Adjudication (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1969), 151.
11. Pescatore, «Fundamental Rights...», AJIL, op. cit., n. 4, p. 
347.
12. See supra, pp. 4-5.
tion of such an act as null and void the 
«...infringement of this Treaty or of any legal rule 
relating to its application». The letter of these provi­
sions implies that the Community law is not to be 
found only in the basic Treaties and the Community 
legislation in general, but also in a set of «general 
principles of law common to the political systems of 
the nine member states».13 This conclusion finds ad­
ditional support in other Articles e.g. 215 EEC and 
188 Euratom treaty, which, on the question of the 
Community’s non-contractual liability for damages, 
make specific reference to the general principles of 
the domestic laws of the member-states.14
It has been contended by scholars who have dealt 
with the subject, that «general principles of law» as 
have been elaborated in the legal literature15 and 
have been applied in the jurisprudence of the Court, 
provide, along with written legislation, an adequate 
substantive law coverage for cases involving human 
rights.16 Given then, the broad discretion that the 
treaties allow the Court in its choice of the law ap­
plicable in each particular case,17 the system for the 
protection of rights of the individual in the context of 
the Community becomes both flexible and effective.
In order to allow ourselves a more precise evalua­
tion of the above judgements we must examine the 
development of the Court’s human rights case-law in 
three particular areas: limitation of rights; general 
principles as sources of law; applicability of the 
European Convention of Human Rights within the 
Community.
13. Cf. D.G. Valentine, The Court of Justice of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (The Hague: Martins Nijhoff, 1961), 
56.
14. These provisions were applied in Wünsche Co. v. EVGF 
(50/71) (1973), CMLR 35 (59/72) (1974) CMLR 61 and in 
Werhan Hansamühle v. Council and Commission (63-69/72) 
(1973), Recueil 1229, 1258. See also L. J. Brinkhorst & H.G. 
Schermers, Supplement to Judicial Remedies in the European 
Communities (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1972), 149-153.
15. See Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals (London, 1953); Lord McNair, 
«The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized 
Nations», British Yearbook of International Law (1958), 1-19; 
Werner Lorenz, «General Principles of Law: Their Elaboration in 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities», American 
Journal of Comparative Law 13 (1964), 1-29.
16. Pescatore, «Fundamental Rights...», AJIL, op. cit. n. 4, p. 
351; and Landau, «Protection...», op. cit., n. 4, p. 299. On the 
same subject Prof. Rudolf Bernhardt, «The Problems of Drawing 
up a Catalogue of Fundamental Rights for the European 
Communities», Annexed in Bulletin of the European Com­
munities, «The protection of fundamental rights...», op. cit., n. 2, 
p. 68, concludes that «... if the protection of fundamental rights is 
entrusted to the Court of Justice by way of general legal principles, 
Community law can progressively be developed by judgements 
rendered in accordance with practical needs».
17. Paul Reuter, La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et 
del’ Acier (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 
1953), 89.
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a. national authorities discretion to impose 
limitations on human rights
The Court was, for the first time, faced with this 
issue in the Van Duyn v. Home Office Case18 where 
the exercise by a member-state of the rights given to 
it in Article 48(3) EEC> i.e.to limit free movement of 
workers on grounds of public policy, public security 
or public wealth, was questioned. The case, referred 
to the Court by the English High Court (Chancery 
Division), involved a Dutch national (Miss van 
Duyn) who was refused entry to England on the 
grounds that she was to take employment with the 
Church of Scientology, an organization which, al­
though not prohibited by national law, was consid­
ered engaged in activities contrary to the public 
good. The Court, although it admitted that «the con­
cept of public policy...must be interpreted strictly, so 
that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by 
each member-state without being subject to control 
by the institutions of the Community», it finally 
concluded that
«...the particular circumstances justifying recourse to the concept 
of public policy may vary from one country to another country and 
from one period to another, and it is therefore necessary in this 
matter to allow the competent national authorities an area of discre­
tion within the limits imposed by the Treaty». (Judgement, para 
18).
With regard to the merits of the case, the Court 
found that a member-state may derogate from the 
principle of free movement of persons within the 
Community (Art. 48 EEC Treaty) in circumstances 
«socially harmful» despite the fact that the treatment 
of a member-state’s nationals becomes, as a result, 
discriminatory to the nationals of other members.19 
Thus, the contents of «public policy» remained un­
specified and certainly to the discretion of the 
member-states.
These criteria, however, were soon to undergo a 
drastic change. The Bonsignore v. The Oberstadt­
direktor of the City of Cologne Case, that came before 
the Court shortly after the Van Duyn Case raised 
again questions involving Art. 48(3) and particularly, 
the compatibility of a deportation order, issued 
against an Italian national by the German authorities, 
with the provisions of Council Directive No. 
64/221/E.E.C. This Directive issued on February 
25th 1964 and aiming at the co-ordination of special 
measures concerning the movement and residence of 
foreign nationals, was also involved in the Van Duyn 
Case. In interpreting it, the Court found this time that 
the concept of «personal conduct» used in the Direc­
ts. Case 41/74 (1975) 1 Common Market Law Reports, pp. 
1-19.
19. Ibid., p. 19.
tive required that a deportation order may only be 
issued for breaches of the peace and public security 
which might be committed by the individual affected 
«...and not, in the words of the national court, on 
reasons of a 'general preventive nature’».20 The de­
cision of the national authorities was, thus, chal­
lenged on the grounds that neither the motive nor the 
justification of the deportation order were to be left 
to their sole discretion.
In the next case, the Rutili v. Minister of the In­
terior Case, the Court went on to focus even more 
narrowly the discretion of national authorities to de­
termine limitations of rights for reasons of public pol­
icy. The case involved again the interpretation of Art. 
48(3) and the provisions of Directives Nos 64/21 
(the same with the cases examined above), 68/630 
and 73/148.
The facts of the case were: An Italian national, 
Roland Rutili, resident of France since his birth in 
1940 and married to a French national, was until 
1968 holder of a privileged resident’s permit and 
domiciled in the department of Mearthe-et-Moselle 
where he worked and became involved in trade union 
activities. In August 1968, a deportation order was 
issued against him. In September of the same year 
another order was issued requiring him to reside in 
the department of Puy-de-Dôme. In October 1970 
Mr. Rutili was granted a residence permit for a na­
tional of a member-state of the EEC but was prohib­
ited from residing in the departments of Moselle, 
Mearthe-et-Moselle and Vosges. He initiated then 
proceedings before the Tribunal Administratif of 
Paris, asking the annulment of the decision that li­
mited the territorial validity of his residence permit. 
The Tribunal decided next, to stay proceedings under 
Art 177 of the EEC Treaty and ask the EEC Court to 
give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the 
expression «subject to limitation justified on grounds 
of public policy» of Art. 48 of the EEC Treaty.
The Court held that
«...restriction cannot be imposed on the right of a national of any 
Member State to enter the territory of another Member State, to 
stay there and to move within it unless his presence or conduct 
constitutes a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to public 
policy».*1
It further, clearly, ruled out the imposition of any 
restriction on nationals of another member state with 
regard not only to their entry into the territory of 
another member state but also on their right to reside 
in any part of its territory «except in cases and cir­
cumstances in which such measures may be applied 
to nationals of the State concerned».22
20. Case 67/74 (1975) 1, CMLR 488.
21. Case 36/75 (1976)1, CMLR 155.
22. Ibid., pp. 157-158.
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The evolution of the concept of national au­
thorities’ discretion to determine issues,e.g. «public 
policy», with a bearing on the exercise of the rights of 
the individual protected by the EEC Treaty, is indeed 
spectacular. Within a period of less than a year, the 
case-law of the Court made large steps towards the 
establishment of tight controls over this discretion. 
The positive results of this development are undeni­
able.
On the other hand, rapid change of legal concepts 
and criteria in areas so sensitive as human rights has 
an inevitable and undesirable consequence, namely a 
degree of legal uncertainty. The need that all actors 
in a human rights violation case,i.e. individual citi­
zens, national authorities and Community organs, 
have clear views with regard to the existing law be­
fore the case reaches the court, is self-evident and 
needs no further elaboration.
b. «general principles» as sources of 
community human rights law
We will turn now to another particularly significant 
question, which arises as a result of the peculiar na­
ture of the Community’s system for the protection of 
human rights. In view of the fact that the Court has to 
resort often to «general principles» in order to fill 
gaps and interpret provisions of written Community 
law, it faced a twofold task. First, it had to preserve 
the autonomy and supremacy of the Community’s 
legal order and ensure that the domestic laws and 
constitutional principles could not be used to abro­
gate acts of the Community’s organs.23 On the other 
hand, the whole concept «general principles» per se 
implies the existence of principles common to the 
legal systems of member-states to which the Court 
must have access.
In his judgement in the Stauder v. City of Ulm 
Case, the Court made a first general reference to 
fundamental rights of the individual as being part of 
the general principles of the law of the Community 
and that the Court must ensure their observance.24
In another case which came before it shortly after­
wards, the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Ein­
fuhr und Verratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
Case, the Court established that this reference to 
general principles should not affect «the unity and 
efficacy of Community Law». The case concerned a 
system known as «agricultural deposits» which in­
tended to enable the Commission as well as the com­
petent national authorities, to exercise control over
23. On the principle of supremacy of Community law, see D. 
Lasok, An Introduction to the Law and Institutions of the European 
Communities (London: Butterworth & Co., 1973), 200.
24. (Case 29/69), CMLR (1970), 119.
the functioning of agricultural markets. However, 
this deposit mechanism although in principle pro­
tected freedom of trade, involved in it a number of 
constraints and burdens. Four firms challenged this 
system before the competent German Court, i.e., the 
Administrative Court of Frankfurt-on-Main which 
found it contrary to certain basic principles of Ger­
man constitutional law, namely freedom of action 
and disposal, economic freedom and proportionality, 
resulting from Articles 2 and 14 of the German Basic 
Law. After making some statements along these lines 
the Administrative Court recognized that the dis­
putes against the Community agricultural regulations 
gave rise to legal uncertainty and decided to submit 
the matter to the Community Court in a request for a 
preliminary ruling.
In its ruling European Court held inter alia that
«Recourse to legal rules or concepts of national law, to judge the 
validity of instruments promulgated by Community institutions 
would have the effect of harming the unity and efficacy of Commun­
ity law. The validity of such instruments can only be judged in the 
light of Community law. In fact the law born from the Treaty, the 
issue of an autonomous source, could not, by its very nature, have 
the courts opposing to its rules of national law of any nature what­
ever without losing its Community character and without the legal 
basis of the Community itself being put in question. Therefore, the 
validity of a Community instrument or its effect within a member- 
state cannot be affected by allegations that it strikes at either the 
fundamental rights as formulated in that State’s constitution or the 
principles of a national constitutional structure.
An examination should be made, however, as to whether some 
analogous guarantee inherent in Community law, has not been 
infringed upon. For respect for fundamental rights is an integral 
part of the general principles of law of which the Court of Justice 
ensures respect. The protection of such rights, while inspired by the 
constitutional principles common to the member-States must be en­
sured within the framework of the Community’s structure and 
objectives».25
The conclusion from this reasoning is that refer­
ence to the member-state’s constitutional principles 
is a privilege of the Court that is to be exercised 
unilaterally and only to the extent that it supports the 
«validity of instruments promulgated by Community 
institutions».26 These principles are not to beconsid- 
ered as a source of law binding the Court and as it 
was made evident in subsequent rulings,e.g. Luisa 
Sabbatini v. European Parliament, 27 Monique Chol­
let v. E. C. Commission,28 the inspiration of the Court 
from them is optional and not based on «previous 
systematic consideration of trans-Community 
standards».29 This holds also true for theSopad Case, 
where the general principle of the non-retroactivity
25. (Case 11/70), CMLR (1972), 283.
26. Ibid.
27. Case 20/71, CMLR (1972), 945.
28. Case 32/71, Ibid.
29. See in particular the Re Civil Service Salaries Case (81/72) 
(1973), CMLR 639.
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of new legislation was found applicable to a Com­
munity regulation.30
This careful systematic evolution of case-law 
guidelines was seriously challenged in a subsequent 
case, the Firma J. Nold KG. v. E.C. Commission31 
decided on May 14, 1974. The case involved an ap­
plication for annulment of a decision of the Commis­
sion of December 21, 1972, which authorized new 
business terms for Ruhrkohle GmbH. The undertak­
ing, J. Nold, a first-stage coal wholesalers partner­
ship, objected essentially on the grounds that the de­
cision authorized the Ruhr coal selling agency to ren­
der direct supplies of coal, subject to the conclusion 
of fixed two-year contracts providing for the pur­
chase of at least 6.000 tons annually for the supply of 
domestic homes and small industry sector, a quantity 
which exceeded by far its annual sales in this sector 
and that the decision, as a result, affected its status as 
a direct wholesaler. The applicant firm asserted, inter 
alia, that certain of its fundamental rights had been 
violated as a result of the restrictions introduced by 
the new trading rules authorized by the Commission 
which had the effect of depriving it of its direct sup­
plies, of endangering the profitability of the under­
taking and the free development of its business activ­
ity and, jeopardizing its very existence. More specifi­
cally, with regard to the applicant, the Commission’s 
decision was said to violate «a-quasi-proprietary 
right» as well as its right to freely pursue a business 
activity, a right protected by Article 14 of the Con­
stitution of the German Federal Republic and by the 
Constitutions of other member States. Also by vari­
ous international treaties, particularly the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and its Protocol of March 
20, 1952.
In its ruling the Court re-asserted that 
«fundamental rights form an integral part of the gen­
eral principles of law which it enforces». It then went 
on to say that
«In assuring the protection of such rights, this Court is required 
to base itself on the constitutional traditions common to the 
member-states and therefore could not allow measures which are 
incompatible with the fundamental rights recognized and guaran­
teed by the constitutions of such states... It is in the light of these 
principles that the plaints raised by the applicant should be 
assessed».32
Therefore, the constitutional laws of member-states 
become a binding source of community law and the 
Court «is required» to base its judgements upon 
them. However, this judgement hardly reconciles 
with the previous jurisprudence of the Court and par­
30. Case 143/73, Recueil 1433.
31. Case 4/73, CMLR (1974:Vol. 2), 338-359.
32. Ibid., p. 354.
ticularly with its judgement in the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft Case where it is affirmed that in 
cases involving human rights the Court is «inspired 
by the constitutional principles common to 
member-states».33 What we are witnessing then, is 
that the Court’s resort to constitutional laws of 
member-states, is transformed into a clear-cut legal 
obligation.
In the light of this conclusion, it would be appro­
priate to put some more emphasis to the Court’s re­
ference to traditions «common to member-states» 
and «recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions 
of such states». As in its previous judgements the 
Court again did not elaborate under what criteria the 
«common» principles are to be sought, specified and 
applied. Recent comparative analysis of the human 
rights safeguards recognized and incorporated in the 
constitutions of member-states has come to the con­
clusion that «considerable differences exist».34 The 
question that arises then is: what are the standards of 
these «common» principles? Shall the Court base its 
judgement on the constitutions that accord the max­
imum protection or on those that accord the 
minimum protection?
Judge Pescatore in interpreting the Court’s judge­
ment in the Nold Case35 as well as in previous ones,36 
argued that the Court’s task is to ensure in each case 
that the standard of protection given to human rights 
must not be inferior to the guarantees accorded by 
any one of the national constitutions of the member- 
states and that «...the method of reconciling and 
levelling will be in an upward direction, that is to say 
towards solution giving the best protection to indi­
vidual rights».37 The statement of the learned judge, 
with all due respect, conflicts both with the letter of 
the Court’s judgement in the Nold Case («common») 
and even more sharply with the judgement in the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft Case where it was 
stressed that: «recourse to legal rules or concepts of 
national law to judge the validity of instruments 
promulgated by Community institutions would have 
the effect of harming the unity and efficacy of Com­
munity law».38
c. the European convention on human rights 
as a source of community law
The European Convention on Human Rights,
33. Op. cit., n. 24. See also Landau, op. cit., n. 4, pp. 294-5.
34. Bernhardt, op. cit., n. 16, p. 45.
35. P. Pescatore, «Les exigences de la démocratie et la 
légitimité de la Communauté Européenne», Cahiers du Droit 
Européen (1974), 499, 512-13, footnote 16.
36. Pescatore, «The Protection of Human Rights...», op. cit., n. 
4, p.79.
37. Ibid.
38. Op. cit., n. 24. See also Landau, op. cit., n. 4, pp. 294-5.
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signed in Rome in November 4, 1950, under the au­
spices of the Council of Europe represents the most 
comprehensive and systematic mechanism for a 
collective-international protection of human rights 
that exists in the world today.39 Since the French 
ratification in 1974, all the member-states of the 
EEC have been bound by the provisions of this Con­
vention. This fact gave a renewed impetus to the 
question of interaction between these two formally 
distinct but essentially highly interrelated legal or­
ders. Is the European Convention a source of Com­
munity law and if the answer is affirmative what is the 
nature of this source? Certainly, the Communities as 
such are not a party to the Convention and they can 
not become a party since the Convention has been 
concluded by states members of the Council of 
Europe and leaves no room for adherence by any 
other subject of international law besides states.
On the other hand the Communities, although en­
dowed with a certain degree of treaty-making capac­
ity, have not and may not become a party to the 
Convention because competence to legislate on 
subject-matters that the Convention deals with has 
not been transferred from the Member-states to the 
Communities.40 Further, for the Court of the EEC to 
be bound by constitutional traditions or international 
agreements to which all member-states are contract­
ing parties,41 an express provision of the Treaty of 
Rome must exist, something which is not the case 
with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Therefore, the question of the treatment of the Con­
vention by the Court as a source of Community law 
must be examined within the general category of 
«general principles».
The Court made reference to the European Con­
vention in two recent cases that we have already re­
viewed, i.e. the Nold Case and the Rutili Case. In the 
latter it referred specifically to the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and to the 
general principles of law enshrined in its provisions 
with regard to the criteria for the establishment of a
39. On the Convention, see J.E.S. Fawcett, The Application of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (Oxford: Clareton 
Press, 1969); G.L. Weil, The European Convention of Human 
Rights (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1963); Phedon Vegleris, «Twenty 
Years Experience of the Convention and Future Prospects» in 
A.H. Robertson ed., Privacy and Human Rights (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1973), 340-424; Polys Modinos, 
«Effects and Repercussions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights», International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. II (1967), 1097-LL08.
40. Sorensen, op. cit., n. 4, p. 7. See also analysis of relevant
issues in British Institute Studies in International and Comparative
Law, No. 6, «Legal Problems of an Enlarged European
Community» ed., by M.E. Bathurst, K.R. Simmons, N. March
Hunnings, Jane Welch (London: Stevens & Sons, 1972), 128-130.
4L E.g. the GATT. See the judgement of the EEC Court in the
Inernational Fruit Co. Case (21-24/72) 18 (1972), Recueil 1219.
balance between the interests of the individual and 
the interests of national security. The judgement 
stated inter alia that
«Taken as a whole, these limitations placed on the powers of 
member States in respect of control of aliens, are a specific man­
ifestation of the more general, principle enshrined in Articles 8, 9, 
10 and 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on November 4, 
1950, and ratified by all Member States, and in Article 2 of Pro­
tocol No 4 of the same Convention signed in Strasbourg on 16 
September 1963, which provided, in identical terms, that no re­
strictions in the interests of national security or public safety shall 
be placed on the rights secured by the above-quoted articles other 
than such as are necessary for the protection of those interests «in 
a democratic society».42
However, in the process of «reception» of general 
principles into the legal order of the Community, re­
sort to international treaties to which the EEC 
member-states are parties, is not conceived as being 
on the same footing as constitutional traditions or 
principles. This conclusion comes from the Court’s 
judgement in the Nold Case where it emphasized that 
«...international treaties on the protection of human 
rights in which the member-states have co-operated 
or to which they have adhered can also supply indica­
tions which may be taken into account within the 
framework of Community law».*3 As it has already 
been mentioned,44 in the same judgement the Court 
referred to constitutional traditions as a source of 
Community law on which it «is required» to base its 
decisions.
It seems, therefore, that the judgement in the Nold 
Case establishes some kind of an hierarchy in the 
«reception» of general principles of law with those of 
the constitutional laws of member-states coming first, 
and those deriving from international conventions 
following.45 An even more substantial difference ap­
pears established between these two sources of law 
with regard to their legal character. While constitu­
tional traditions are raised to the status of a binding 
source of Community law, international conventions 
are regarded as being of a persuasive or exhortative 
nature, with no binding effects whatsoever. The dif­
ferentiation, however, is hardly justifiable in so far as 
the treaty-law of the Community is concerned. This is 
so because according to this law neither the nine na­
tional Constitutions (both written and unwritten) nor 
the international treaties are recognized as formal 
sources of Community law.46
The consequences of this distinction can be further 
realized on more practical grounds. One of the issues 
that emerged from the preceeding analysis is the un-
42. Op. cit., n. 21.
43. Op. cit., n. 30, p. 354.
44. See supra, p. 19.
45. Landau, op. cit,. n. 4, p. 295.
46. Ibid.
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certainty regarding the formulation of specific stan­
dards for human rights. The existence of such stan­
dards would have made easier the task of the Court 
to accord justice in human rights cases involving is­
sues which have not been touched upon in the Com­
munity Treaties. The European Convention on 
Human Rights, on the other hand, incorporates in its 
provisions, all those human rights principles com­
monly held and safeguarded in the constitutions of 
the EEC member-states, which are now all Contract­
ing Parties to the Convention. Further, the Conven­
tion and its Protocols, is not limited to economic and 
social rights, which may at the present be regarded as 
being of primary significance for the Community, but 
is principally concerned with civil and political rights. 
Provisions on such rights are present only inciden­
tally in the EEC treaties, a fact with significant con­
sequences not only for the future but for the present 
operation of the Community as well.
It seems, therefore, that the Convention, covering 
a variety of categories of individual rights, meets the 
need for a comprehensive «common» standard, that 
would facilitate enormously the Court’s process of 
«reception» of «general principles» into Community 
law. It is in this sense that the Court’s refusal to ac­
cord to the principles incorporated in the Convention 
the same status that it recognized for the constitu­
tional traditions common to «member states» be­
comes more difficult to understand.
d. some conclusions
In the preceeding discussion, an attempt was made 
to outline some of the questions that the existing sys­
tem of legal protection of human rights in the EEC 
may give rise to. The jurisprudence of the Court, in 
the cases analyzed, reveals a certain degree of incon­
sistency and lack of clarity, in so far as the develop­
ment of EEC human rights case-law is concerned. 
The cause of this inconsistency is certainly not the 
incompetence of the learned and highly qualified 
judges that form the Court. It is rather a result of 
legal obscurity, a quality inherent in the system of law 
on which the Court is required to base its judge­
ments. Despite this, it seems probable that in its fu­
ture judgements, the Court will overcome some of 
the problems involved, and the evolution of its 
human rights case-law will follow a more smooth and 
clear process. But even in view of such an eventuality 
several questions remain unanswered.
The Court’s function in the general framework of 
the institutions of the Community is defined in Arti­
cle 164 of the EEC Treaty as follows: «the Court of 
Justice shall ensure observance of law and justice in 
the interpretation and application of this Treaty». 
Nowhere in the European Communities’ Treaties it is
stated that the Court has been given power to legis­
late on behalf of the Community. Unlike the Council 
and the Commission (Art. 189), which enact legisla­
tion through regulations, directives and decisions, the 
Court may only interpret the existing law and also 
state what the law is when explicit Community legis­
lation does not provide for it.47 This does not mean 
that the Court does not or should not contribute, 
through its rulings, to the evolution of Community 
law. But in the case of human rights, the silence of 
written provisions in important matters and their lim­
ited scope in general, make the whole issue of 
«evolution» of law highly problematic. The judicial 
authority of the Community simply «lacks any direct 
democratic mandate»48 as to the direction and limits 
in the process of the evolution of human rights law 
within the Community. Even under the present state 
of European integration,where only a limited section 
of the total legal relationship between the individual 
and public authorities is involved, the development 
of human rights law by the Court without its deci­
sions having a clear basis on the Treaties establishing 
the Communities may create a precedent with future 
undesirable consequences.
In the light of this analysis a recommendation 
made by Prof. Rudolf Bernhardt in his recent study, 
prepared on the request of the EEC Commission, 
becomes particularly relevant. He suggests that 
under present conditions, it is indispensable that the 
other Community organs, i.e. the Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission, acknowledge in an ex­
press declaration «the validity of fundamental rights 
in the European Communities and their protection 
by the Court of Justice».49 Even if such declaration 
would have no binding force, it would, undoubtedly, 
encourage states accepting the Court’s future initia­
tives in the field.
A second issue must also be considered relating to 
an individual’s capacity to institute proceedings be­
fore the Court in cases involving human rights viola­
tions. As the system stands now the infringement of 
obligations undertaken by a state under the EEC 
Treaty might give rise to a direct action before the 
Court at the suit either of the Commission or other 
organs as well (Art. 175 (3)) or of another Member 
State but never by an individual without some prior 
action (Art. 175 (3), 177). If an individual believes 
that his rights have been affected by an infringement 
of the Treaty by a member-state he can, certainly, 
lodge a complaint with the Commission. It is at the 
discretion of the Commission to decide that, for 
reasons independent of the merits of the complaint,
47. P.S.R.F. Mathijsen, A Guide to European Community Law 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1972), 151-2.
48. See Bernhardt, op. cit., n. 16, p. 68.
49. Ibid., p. 69.
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the moment is not appropriate for the institution of 
proceedings under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty. 
The person affected can not normally invoke Article 
175—despite the broad wording of paragr. 3—to 
force the Commision to act.50 But even on the as­
sumption that the Commission does initiate the two- 
stage procedure envisaged in Article 169, it may take 
months or even years before the case can be decided. 
The remedy, then, seems inadequate to provide to 
the individual effective protection in case of an abuse 
of its fundamental rights.
One way open to the individual to reach the Court 
of Justice is by instituting proceedings before a com­
petent national court. Cases that can be brought be­
fore this court are those involving (a) disputes be­
tween national authorities of member states and pri­
vate individuals concerning the application by the 
former of directly applicable Community law.(b) a 
challenge of the applicability of national law on the 
grounds that it is incompatible with Community law. 
(c) the applicability of a Community act on the 
grounds,e.g. that it is contrary to the Treaty provi­
sions and therefore invalid, (d) substantive rights con­
ferred by Community law, e.g. the case of a plaintiff 
who has been refused leave to enter United Kingdom 
and who claims that as a national of a member-state 
of the EEC he is entitled under Community law to 
enter United Kingdom and take up employment 
there.51 In all these cases, a question or questions 
may be referred to the European Court by a national 
court at any stage of the proceedings either at its own 
volition or at the request of either party.
However, while the jurisdiction of the EEC Court 
is limited in proceedings for a preliminary ruling to 
ruling on the interpretation or validity of «acts» of 
Community institutions—including recommenda­
tions, etc. —or execution of decision etc., the national 
court retains its exclusive jurisdiction to apply the 
ruling of the European Court in reaching its decision 
on the merits.52 Under these conditions, an amend­
ment of the Treaties which would grant to the af­
fected individual direct access to the European Court 
in cases involving violation of his fundamental rights, 
would be enormously beneficial to the Community’s 
system for the protection of these rights in toto. Such 
a right of direct petition would constitute a major 
step towards a more uniform human rights Commun­
ity law (an aim only partially served with the proce­
dure of preliminary rulings). Even more, it would 
enhance the democratic image that the Community
50. In order to act the Commission must be under a legal obli­
gation to do so, see joined cases 19 and 21/60, 2 and 3/61 Fives 
Lille Cail v. High Authority, Recueil 1961, p. 561.
51. See e.g. Van Duyn v. Home Office (1974), supra, p. 11.
52. Francis G. Jacobs, References to the European Court: Prac­
tice and Procedure (London: Butterworths Co., 1975), 153.
as a whole has, or should have, for the peoples of 
Europe.
The final issue to be touched on in this discussion, 
the question of a fundamental rights catalogue for the 
Communities, has already caused a considerable de­
gree of disagreement among scholars.53 Each side has 
strong arguments to support its views and in order to 
keep the promise that we gave in the introduction of 
this paper, i.e. to limit ourselves (to the extent that 
this is possible) to problems of the present or of the 
immediate future, we will abstain from any elabora­
tion of the issues involved.
We will take, however, this opportunity to give 
some emphasis to a question that has so far received 
no attention in relevant discussions. This refers to the 
repercussions that such a catalogue of rights, becom­
ing legally binding by means of a formal supplement 
to the Community Treaties (in the form of an inter­
national treaty to be ratified according to the law of 
each member-state) might have for the protection of 
human rights in the non-EEC West-European states.
It can be reasonably expected that such a catalogue 
of rights should be drafted in a way that three re­
quirements will be met: (a) an evolutionary concep­
tion of the Communities taking into account the 
prospects for a closer political co-operation among 
the EEC countries and of an enhanced political au­
thority of the Community’s institutions, (b) the rights 
to be protected can not be limited to those that the 
present activity of the Community is more likely to 
threaten and, therefore, political and civil rights must 
be included, (c) the standard of such a protection 
must go far beyond the one currently accorded to 
these rights by the European Convention of Human 
Rights, signed under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe.
Even if we suppose that such a new system will be 
confined to the activities of a supranational Com­
munity institutions and will not provide for protec­
tion against acts of national authorities which will not 
be stricto sensu Community acts, the consequence 
will be more or less the same: a group of countries 
will participate in two formally distinct human rights 
protections systems and in each one of them it will 
guarantee for the same rights different standards of 
protection. To go one step further, this would mean 
that the EEC countries are solemnly abandoning the 
idea of «european unity» (in so far as a broader 
Europe, represented by the Council of Europe is 
concerned) not only in the economic sphere—already 
a fait accompli—but also in the field of democratic 
rights.
On the assumption then that such a «european
53. See Bernhardt, op. cit., n. 16, pp. 67-69.
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unity» in the field of human rights is conceived by the 
Community in a broad geographical sense, one is 
tempted to suggest a more comprehensive and realis­
tic method for the realization of such a «unity». The 
existing pattern of strong, economic in particular, 
links, between non-EEC Council of Europe Mem­
bers and the Community should motivate the mem­
bers of the latter to take the initiative and propose an 
amendment, identical to both the EEC Treaties and 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
would make respect for the rights of the individual 
guaranteed in the Convention, an explicit and abso­
lute requirement for economic cooperation with or 
within the Community.
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